1. In challenging Hegelianism, both Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer resort to the principle: primum vivere, deinde philosophari. That they should both refer to a principle that even in ancient times had already acquired proverbial status is not surprising. What is striking is that they interpret it in two radically different ways, and consequently use it to move two different accusations. The question is whether both interpretations were part of a long-standing cultural tradition or, on the contrary, each constitutes an adaptation ad hoc of a maxim whose traditional meaning was basically univocal.

2. To begin with, it is evident that this principle implies a distinction, if not a complete separation, between practical and theoretical life. As far as this aspect is concerned, we are bound to examine, first of all, the position of Aristotle, the first to theorize this distinction in a speculatively articulated fashion. In Book VII of the Politics, Aristotle says that, to identify the best type of society, it is necessary to know the best way of life for an individual. The reason is that whether human beings are taken individually or collectively, their end remain the same;[1] therefore, what is best for the individual is best for the community, just as the goals of the best man coincide with those of the best government of society.[2] To identify the best way of life for individuals, Aristotle goes back to his discussion of the division of the soul into two parts, earlier in the same work: [3] a «superior» part that commands because it is in itself possessed of reason, and an «inferior» one that lacks reason and obeys the former.[4] As for the «superior» part, Aristotle sees the reason, too, as divided into two parts, the «practical» and the «theoretical».[5] Since the «theoretical» part is superior to the «practical» part, it follows that an individual must favor the theoretical activities of the rational soul over its practical activities, and both of these over the activities of the irrational soul.[6]

Thus the distinction between philosophari and vivere found in the proverbial saying originates in the Aristotelian disjunction of theoretical life from other human functions. One should note, however, that Aristotle, even while organizing the three types of «activities» in a hierarchical order, acknowledges that not everybody can attain to the highest type of life. He states that, consequently, all individuals should try to raise themselves above the activities of the irrational soul, the lowest and of least value, common to everybody, and aspire at least to reach the level of the activities of practical reason. Consequently, the proverbial saying should not be seen as suggesting a preeminence of vivere over philosophari. Incidentally, the latter interpretation is indirectly supported by Aristotle himself, who states that in the life of an individual, besides distinguishing between business and leisure or war and peace, one must also distinguish between useful and necessary activities, on the one hand, and beautiful ones on the other. The inferior elements must be seen as functional to the superior ones; thus, war must be functional to peace, activity to leisure; and the function of all useful and necessary actions in general is to make beautiful ones possible.[7] Only superior activities bring authentic happiness, the true zen kalos.[8]

3. Kierkegaard interprets the principle — primum vivere, deinde philosophari — in pretty much the same way. But with a significant variant: for him, too, philosophy has an unquestionable priority, but he rejects the almost absolute preeminence that Hegel attributes to it. For Kierkegaard, Hegel’s thesis that nothing must «precede» theoretical reflection, that philosophy must be based only on itself,[9] has «amazed the world» but is really an absurd claim.[10] Such a philosophy takes to their extreme the defects inherent in any systematic conception. Being completely immune to the often misleading influences of empirical reality, it may admittedly boast a very high level of abstraction and respectable demonstrative rigor. Yet, for these very reasons, it inevitably places itself beyond the pale of everyday life. Furthermore, such a philosophy is not only a «theory» basically and radically foreign to real «life» but exposes people to the dangerous temptation of an understandably attractive but nevertheless unacceptable estrangement, a reassuring retreat into the fragile world of concepts, an escape to a perfect life in the ethereal world of thought. In the end, says Kierkegaard, one creates a castle only to live in a hay-loft. Such pure thoughts, such perfect systems, such fascinating concepts are not «inhabited» by their authors, because it is not possible to live in them; they do not correspond to actual needs.[11]

Kierkegaard, in fact, not only exposes the gap, typical of idealistic systems, between life and thought [12] but also denounces the impossibility of overcoming it, caused by an undue inversion of the two poles. Hegelianism clearly demonstrates that authentic idealistic systems are based on the notion that thought precedes life not only in the ontological sense but also anthropologically, i.e. not only in the sense that reality could not exist without the Logos that constitutes its essence and law, but also and more importantly, in the sense that human beings, as individuals and as humanity, produce life only by expressing in it the Logos, the rationality of the whole , which finds in the conceptual thought of the individuals the privileged site of its manifestation. Does thought precede life, then? It would be, Kierkegaard notes, like elaborating a «philosophy of art» without having any experience whatsoever of art. Hence, just the opposite is true: «Life comes first, then theory.» The Danish philosopher asserts this point forcibly: theory comes after! Long after or shortly after, it does not matter, but after. To return to the previous example, what would a philosophy of art have to theorize about if there were no works of art? [13]

Unlike Aristotle, then, Kierkegaard does not hold life to be related to theory as an inferior form to a superior one, but rather sees life as providing the necessary material for theory. In other words, life is not simply the physical existence common to humans and animals but is also to experience reality, to act in the world through one’s humanity; and theory is not «leisure» (skolé), not pure, pacifying, beatifying contemplation [14] but that which enables one to live fully, acting with increased self-awareness.

Kierkegaard does not exalt the power of thought. He does not share Hegel’s faith in the power of pure understanding. He disbelieves especially in the effectiveness, on a practical level, of rational thought. Instead, he asserts a kind of axiological supremacy of praxis. The important thing is to act. People’s destiny is forged by actions, not by thought. Their life depends on what they choose to do. Each choice entails the risk of error, even of death, and not even the most thorough understanding can eliminate this risk. The real struggle of people, says Kierkegaard, is to change existence. It is a titanic undertaking, which idealistic positions minimize using arguments that are actually a more or less obvious sham concocted for unsophisticated minds. Says Kierkegaard: It is an immense deceit to make people believe that understanding great things is all it takes to accomplish them; from understanding to action there is an infinite distance, greater than the distance between not understanding and understanding.[15] Kierkegaard’s criticism is directed against what he sees as a trifling with reason by Hegel and his followers. In general, as in the case of Christianity, Hegel’s results, which, as Kierkegaard ironically underlines, are heralded by trumpets and horns as the explanation of everything, present the problem in an imprecise manner. In other words, in spite of all his «understanding,» Hegel is not a real philosopher. First live, then philosophize. Life is necessary for philosophy to exist. Hegel must have been an insignificant person; and for this reason, he was certainly an extraordinary professor of philosophy, but not a thinker.[16]

4. In any case, Kierkegaard does not underestimate the philosophari; indeed, if possible, he considers it even more preeminent than Hegel does, who defines it as the highest of human values. The key to Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the principle primum vivere, deinde philosophari lies in his distinction between «philosopher» and «professor of philosophy.» [17]

Kierkegaard notes that he has always maintained that Hegel was «a `professor’ of the highest level.» But this is not really meant as a compliment. Says Kierkegaard: «A day will come when this concept of `professor’ will give rise to a comic character.» [18]

Actually, a comic character of this sort already inhabited the realm of literature under the name of Pangloss, a professor of metaphysical-theo-cosmo-idiotology created by the lively phantasy of Voltaire. Like Hegel, Pangloss is German, and shares with him a pan-logical, and hence “optimistic,” view of reality. A propounder of the Leibnizian Verbum, Pangloss is convinced that ours is the best of all possible worlds, since — as Candide, his admiring disciple, goes about repeating in order to find a “rational” justification for all his absurd misfortunes —, everything is necessarily connected and arranged for the best; in other words, everything is dominated by a universal reason, ruled by the supreme law of purpose.[19] Nothing in the universe happens by chance; contradictions do not exist, and everything contributes to the harmony of the whole. Even the Fall and Curse of man are necessarily part of the best of possible worlds, and liberty can coexist with absolute necessity.[20]

While discovering the «sufficient reason» of all possible events and his “irrefutable” a priori demonstrations, Pangloss, too, lives as a prisoner in a world of pure concepts, even though he is not above giving “dangerous” lessons of «experimental physics» to a young maid-servant.[21] He stubbornly insists on finding an unlikely rationale for all things, even when the events seem to conspire against him and all humanity. He remains convinced of the perfection of the world even when he is forced to flee war and suffers all sorts of misfortunes; he even decrees syphilis, which has turned him into the shadow of a man, to be the last, absolutely rational effect of a long chain of causes, whose final result is the common good: specific evils cause the general good, so that the more specific evils exist, the more everything goes well![22]

What then do the «professors» lack, according to Kierkegaard? In a well-known page of his Diary he contrasts the professores with the confessores: how Christianity has changed from the days of inflexible confessores to now, when the professores are flexible and declinable in all cases! [23] The original Christians “inhabited” their ideas, which arose from their experience of life. They lived those ideas, bearing witness to them in their concrete life; and they “confessed” them to the point of suffering martyrdom. Modern professors, instead, do not derive their truths from life, but from their games with dialectics.[24] Furthermore, their truths are certainly not worth dying for, given that the authors themselves are «declinable according to all cases.»

For Kierkegaard, then, the primum and the deinde of the cited principle have first of all a temporal value; to be able to philosophize, one must first experience the world and people. But the principle acquires an even more significant aspect in Kierkegaard’s thought. For Kierkegaard, the vivere of the saying is not only a “condition of possibility,” the conditio sine qua non of philosophari — without the experience of reality there is nothing to speculate on and, therefore, no authentic theoretical reflection — but is above all its “condition of value”: philosophy is valuable only if reflects lived, “vital” truths.

Unlike Aristotle, Kierkegaard does not derive the excellence of philosophy from its speculative nature, its being a manifestation of the «superior» part of the individual, expressing the «best» part of the soul. Nor is this excellence produced by a condition of «leisure» — the latter being, according to Aristotle, the best life. More precisely, the excellence of philosophy cannot be reduced to a matter of living in that condition of «peace» and active «leisure,» according to the principles of temperance and justice, that generates the sublime enjoyment of «recreation».[25] The excellence of philosophy lies in its being the expression of a life, a lived and perhaps endured life, of committed militancy in a worldly existence. The person who does not live fully is unaware of life’s burden and the distress it creates; he or she does not inhabit his or her ideas on life, does not “confess” them, does not “bear witness” to them.

5. Schopenhauer’s position is different. He moves harsh charges against the Hegelian view of speculative activity, nor does he go easy on Hegel himself. According to Schopenhauer, true philosophy is something totally different. How much his speculations may have been influenced by his academic misadventures with the Hegelian tendencies of the establishment is of little concern within this context. It is a fact, however, that in the introduction to the first edition of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, of 1818 — the year after Hegel wrote the Encyclopedia, and the same year that Hegel, with the help and approval of the government, received the chair at the University of Berlin that had previously been Fichte’s — Schopenhauer advocates a philosophical method completely different from all previous ones.[26] This method was developed, says Schopenhauer, after the reading of Kant removed a cataract from his eyes. His work, says Schopenhauer with unconcealed pride, is written for the few, namely those who have been able to step aside from the common way of thinking.[27]

Schopenhauer is not lacking in sarcasm. His ideas, he notes, have developed at a time when there is no dearth of brilliant thinkers; Germany has plenty of profound, original, absolutely indispensable works and is certainly not lacking in deep, ingenious philosophers! He is convinced that now knowledge has developed into modes and forms such as to make paradox indistinguishable from error, and that no one will understand what for him is indisputable truth.[28]

Indeed, Schopenhauer’s contemporaries, all under the spell of Hegelianism, failed to understand him. For this reason, in the introduction to the second edition of 1844 — Hegel had been dead for over ten years, but Hegelianism had sunk its roots into all areas of knowledge and its eradication was far from accomplished — Schopenhauer, putting irony aside, declared: «Not on my contemporaries, not on my countrymen — on humanity do I bestow my by now completed work». His generation, which, in the recent past, had honored and admired «what is false, wicked, and finally absurd and senseless», was still absorbed in its ephemeral dream.[29] Only in recent years had Schelling been appointed to the University of Berlin by Frederick William IV, with the charge of fighting the “dragon seed” of Hegelianism, but the enterprise had proved itself arduous from the outset due to the strenuous resistance of the Hegelian faction.

This is the context in which Schopenhauer resorts to the argument: primum vivere, deinde philosophari. But, differently from Kierkegaard, he does not argue that the saying had been ignored by the Hegelians; rather, they had adhered to it toto corde, giving it too much importance and following it too literally.

Well, what does Schopenhauer really mean by this?

6. He starts out with a quite general argument: those who dedicate themselves to something that does not produce a material benefit cannot count on the support of their contemporaries. This is why, as literary history demonstrates, it has always taken a long time for valuable work to be appreciated, whereas what is false has never had any trouble in captivating the superficial intelligence of the majority. In other words, a lofty, noble striving, such as that which aims for light and truth, cannot exist independently and prosper undisturbed in the present world. And if, by a quirk of fate, it does manage to find utterance and an acknowledgement of some kind, it is immediately overwhelmed by the play of «material interests,» becoming the instrument or mask for goals that have nothing to do with its authentic source of inspiration. Philosophy, too, says Schopenhauer, is not immune from this fate. Kant restored philosophy to its rightly deserved position, but it at once became an instrument for «other» ends. Specifically, its goals have been imposed both from above, the goals «of the State,» and from below, the «personal» goals of its practitioners. In the hands of mediocre people, incapable of looking beyond material interests, it has been distorted into a false image of itself.[30]

Schopenhauer proceeds relentlessly. The drive toward truth is so noble and demanding that not everyone and, in some periods, scarcely anyone can maintain the pace. This would be expected to discourage men of lesser intelligence. Yet, in Germany, notes Schopenhauer, there is a host of people who write and talk about philosophy, a surprisingly and suspiciously lively theoretical activity.[31] What ever may be the purpose of so much industriousness? Let us not be fooled, says Schopenhauer: the goal is practical, not ideal. None of these alleged «universal sages» have much use for truth; their primum mobile is interest, private interests combined with those of the Church and/or the State and/or the Party and/or Office.[32] Indeed, the «philosophical din» prevents truth from being recognized even when it chances to emerge somehow. Furthermore, says Kierkegaard, truth is no whore, she does not throw her arms around the neck of those who do not desire her. Truth does not give itself to professional «philosophers,» nor does it take part in a «philosophy» that has become an instrument of government and personal, material gain.[33]

These are hard times, says Schopenhauer. Governments view philosophy as a powerful instrumentum regni. Correspondingly, there are many who see theoretical activity as a way of making a living. Serving the State through a noble profession! After all, the idea that philosophy could be just another means for making a living was already in fashion among the Sophists. Nor has singing the praises of the one who feeds us ever been a cause for scandal, adds Schopenhauer. Thus have the goals of the State become at once the criterion for objective truth, the Polar Star of sages’ intellectual activity, and the very reason for their individual existence. Hence, in order of value: primum vivere, deinde philosophari.[34]

The reference to the Sophists is not accidental. A few pages earlier, Schopenhauer, referring to the probity and frankness of his own writings, had stressed the sharp contrast with those of the three celebrated «sophists» of the post-Kantian period. Certainly, he argues, he cannot be attributed with Fichte or Schelling’s pompous vacuity nor Hegel’s quackery. The term sophist is used again shortly thereafter: people have long given up studying Kant. Instead, the new generation of apprentice philosophers wastes its time perusing the abstruse prattle of mediocre thinkers, the pompous ravings of sophists. Distorted by the foolishness of Hegelianism, minds have gotten use to taking the most nonsensical rigmarole for high philosophical thought, the most vulgar sophisms for a sign of intellectual acumen, and the most stupid extravagances for examples of dialectics.[35] In all periods, notes Schopenhauer bitterly at the end of the introduction, the Gorgiases and Hippiases have managed to keep afloat, ensuring the triumph of absurdity.[36]

It is for this reason that Schopenhauer finds perfectly understandable the obstinate strategy of silence adopted toward his work by all those philosophy professors from whose narrow, foreshortened and dense skulls the gaze protrudes only towards personal interest. There is too deep a gulf, too radical a diversity of goals, between the person who aspires to truth — truth alone, naked, unrewarded, friendless, often persecuted — and those who follow the principle, explicitly quoted by Schopenhauer in Latin, of primum vivere, deinde philosophari. On the basis of that principle, the latter deliberately avoid commenting on writings that could rekindle a taste for authentic, speculative investigation, while they exult like Corybants over the works of «professional philosophy» churned out by their cronies. These people wish to live first, and live off philosophy, along with their entire family. They have pinned all their hopes on their alma mater, the «nourishing university philosophy,» that which picks its way shrewdly, «keeping one eye out for the fear of God, another for the position of the Minister, the precepts of the local Church, the desires of the Publisher, the clientele of the students, the friendship of colleagues, the current political situation, the latest public fashion, and Heaven knows what else.» [37]

7. As one can see, the saying has different meanings in Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer according to how the words vivere and philosophari are taken. Unlike Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, in the above passages, does not conceive living as experiencing existence in all its aspects, and especially the most dramatic ones, or, to refer to what he himself theorized, as experiencing the pain and boredom that characterizes the existence of any individual. Nor does he conceive philosophari as the sifting of that experience through the filter of reason, as the identification of the bases and the conditions of existence and the understanding of the reasons for its burden; and even less as bearing witness to the effort, the complexity, and the seriousness of existence, and therefore to the misery and suffering deriving from the simple fact of being alive.

In Schopenhauer instead, vivere and philosophari take on an ironic nuance, indeed the very overtones of derision, the bitterness of sarcasm. It becomes evident how living, in the sense of striving to ensure the material and social basis of one’s existence, is for Schopenhauer a paltry thing. It is not authentic living, even less so for those who aspire to the role of philosopher, “the lover of wisdom.” Likewise, a philosophy conceived and practiced not as an end in itself but as a way to make a living and to acquire and mantain a public role and social dignity, and, at the same time, as a means for political and religious institutions to control and discipline people, establishing a consensus among the masses, such a philosophy, for Schopenhauer, has nothing to do with the search for truth, the effort to reveal, as far as possible, the mysteries of human existence as well as the secrets of the reality in which each individual is situated.

Thus the Hegelians, who for Kierkegaard underestimate the experience of existence and give insufficient thought to their concrete worldly situation, are seen by Schopenhauer as all too preoccupied with the concrete conditions of their existence, so much so that they make these the main and indeed the only concern of their life, sacrificing truth itself, along with their own dignity.

In Kierkegaard’s view, Hegelians give too much importance to philosophical activity. They see as their supreme goal the “absolute” condition of the spirit and as their ultimate intellectual achievement the discernment of the recondite, inner workings of reality. In the process they lose sight of the petty, concrete way in which they actually spend their days. For Schopenhauer, instead, they have so little consideration for philosophy that they enroll dialectics in the service of power, and put their speculative intelligence at the disposal of whoever guarantees them and their families prosperity, peace and respectability. Of course, the two interpretations do not exclude one another, but this is another matter.

8. In any case, the notion that the life of the body comes before the life of the mind has a long-standing tradition. For one thing, it is a topos usually attributed to popular wisdom: first one must ensure the means of survival, and only then dedicate oneself to intellectual pursuits, since the life of the spirit cannot exist if the needs of the body are not adequately satisfied. Material life is a prerequisite for spiritual life. There is no lack of supporters for this position. In Book III of the Republic, when speaking of the education of the «guardians,» Plato discusses the relationship between education of the soul and education of the body. His thesis is that the education of the body must be reasonable; while maniacal excesses should be avoided, the importance of this education should not be underestimated. Although an excessive interest in the body can cause a person to neglect his work and, in general, the arts, it is also true that without adequate physical care the superior functions of a person run the risk of being impaired as well.[38] It is in this context that Plato has Socrates state Phocylides’ maxim according to which one must exercise virtue once the means of material well-being have been ensured.[39] For Plato’s Socrates, it is absurd that an obsession with the care of the body should cause one to give up learning, meditation and private reflection on account of the prejudiced notion that philosophical activity is a cause of vertigo and headaches; but it is also impossible to dedicate oneself to philosophy if the body is not in sound condition. Hence, living, in the sense of enjoying the necessary degree of good health, precedes philosophy and constitutes the material basis of virtue.[40]

The notion underlying Phocylides’ maxim was rather successful and often shows up in the paroemiographic tradition, with philosophari substituted for the more generic virtus. The maxim is found in the collection falsely attributed to Diogeneanus, a famous grammarian of the time of Hadrian, [41] and in the collection by Gregorius of Cyprus, patriarch of Constantinople in the 13th century.[42] And it is also found in the collection by Arsenius, [43] although in a somewhat modified form: «one must seek the means of subsistence; and virtue after one has a living.»

In these examples, beyond the acknowledgement of a basic truth — one cannot exercise any virtue whatsoever when oppressed by the pangs of hunger, or when in the throes of physical pain — we also find the exhortation to a wise behavior, or rather, to a common-sense attitude.

In Horace, this “truth” is found in a quite different form. In his version, pecunia takes the place of “means of subsistence,” making the subordination of “spiritual life” to “practical motivations” much more reprehensible. In Epistle I, the saying is set in the context of an attack on moral decadence and the inversion of values that has occurred in the Roman society of his period. He notes the saying that he hears everywhere, on the lips of old people as well as of the young: «o citizens, citizens, money must be sought first, virtue after pelf» forgetting that «silver is of less worth than gold, gold than virtues».[44] Horace, therefore, exalts virtus over vita. In this Epistle, the question is not over the priority of what is necessary to physical subsistence; rather there is an attack on that craving for wealth that causes individuals to perceive the lack of superfluous goods as painful.

9. In fact, Schopenhauer’s polemical interpretation is based on this later tradition. He, too, however, introduces a significant variant. Schopenhauer wants especially to denounce the institutionalized Hegelians, whose behavior has caused philosophy to lose all its excellence. For these people, philosophy comes after life as a value. For superficial people, making a living is paramount. Life comes first; above all else there is life, and — here is the novelty — even philosophy can be indentured to this overriding purpose.

Thus, for Schopenhauer there are two types of philosophical activity. There is the philosophari that aims at truth and therefore maintains its excellence, although it, too, is subject to the basic limitations imposed by the material needs of the individual; and the philosophy that aims at vivere. The former has no place among “professional tasks,” where the very servitude implicit in the role leaves no room for authentic speculation.

Surprisingly, however, the notion that spiritual life is subordinate to material life, insofar as the latter is the condition of its existence, can also be found in Aristotle and specifically in the Politics. For Aristotle, one can philosophize only if all the primary needs of everyday life have been satisfied. From this point of view, the primum and the deinde of the maxim have at the same time a conditional and temporal value.

For Aristotle, philosophy is the culmination of human life. It is also the prerequisite for the full enjoyment of material goods. Aristotle maintains that the lógos and the noûs are the intrinsic goal of nature; hence, one must direct one’s habits toward reason and intellect. Aristotle states, as we noted above, that humans are divided into soul and body to which a rational and an irrational soul correspond. The specific «states» of these two souls are the appetite and pure thought. In order of generation, the body precedes the soul; thus, the irrational soul precedes the rational soul, and appetite precedes intellect. Indeed, in babies, impulse, will, and desire manifest themselves immediately, whereas reason and intellect develop only later on. For this reason, Aristotle upholds the second interpretation of the maxim primum vivere, deinde philosophari. The care of the body must precede that of soul, and the care of the appetites must precede that of the intellect; for the care of the body is functional to that of the soul, and the care of the appetites is functional to that of the intellect.[45]

What is striking, however, is that in Aristotle one also finds arguments supporting Schopenhauer’s disgust for servile forms of philosophy. At the beginning of Book VIII of the Politics, Aristotle, in discussing the education of the young, notes the disorientation of people, or rather the lack of criteria of judgment, in regards to certain questions of indisputable importance. So what ought the young person to seek? That which is useful to life, that which leads to virtue, or something else again? Actually, there is not even any agreement on what leads to virtue. Indeed, everybody exalts virtue, but then nobody agrees on exactly what it is. In any case, among the various disciplines, certainly one must cultivate the useful ones. Not all of them, however. The necessary ones must be learned, but, of the others, one must prefer the «liberal» ones and avoid those that debase the individual, that is, those that do not allow the body and the mind of free individuals to pursue that which virtue demands. The distinction between «liberal» and «non-liberal» is a precise criterion of evaluation for Aristotle. There are activities, products and professions that are inherently degrading; for example, those that ruin the body. Others that can become debasing if not rightly pursued. Dedicating oneself to the liberal sciences certainly is not bad, but if done in excess, it can distract one from the pursuit of virtue. Other activities can become debasing on account of their goals, rather than of the way they are carried out. To act to one’s advantage, or to that of one’s friends, or for the sake of virtue, is not debasing for a free person in itself; but acting «for» others is debasing if done for mercenary or servile reasons.[46]

And is not acting for others, or with others in mind, or even under the direct orders of others, in order to obtain some little personal gain, exactly the type of debasing behavior that Aristotle decries? From this point of view, Aristotle’s words appear as a polite denunciation of all future «hack» philosophers. They give authoritative support to Schopenhauer’s indignation, contempt, and disgust for the philosophers of his time. It is not a question, not even in Aristotle, of sacrificing the often inescapable needs of practical life to the sublime goals of philosophy, but of giving each its due and upholding philosophy as the manifestation of a free spirit. To always and everywhere seek the useful, Aristotle admonishes, is not suited to good and noble individuals.[47] Nature certainly demands that necessary things be accomplished, but this should be done in «leisure,» the condition of pleasure and happiness, the blissful condition [48] that is characteristic of the free spirit.

Notes

[1] Aristotle, Pol. VII 1334a, 11-12, ed. W.D.Ross, Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1978, p. 242.

[2] Aristotle, Pol. VII 1333b, 37, p. 241; VII 1334a 12-13, p. 242.

[3] Aristotle, Pol. I, 1260a, 5-7, p. 23. But see also Eth. Nich. I, 13, 1102a, 26 ff.

[4] Aristotle, Pol. VII 1333a, 16, p. 239.

[5] Aristotle, Pol. VII 1333a, 25, p. 239.

[6] Aristotle, Pol. VII 1333a, 27-28, p. 239.

[7] Aristotle, Pol. VII 1333a, 30-36, p. 240.

[8] Aristotle, Pol. VII 1333b, 25, p. 241.

[9] See G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, par. 1 and 7.

[10] S. Kierkegaard, Begrebet Angest, Samlede Vaerker, II ed., Kiøbenhavn 1920 ff., vol. IV, chap. 3. See also Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, P.H.Heiberg-V. Kuhr-E. Torsting eds., Kiøbenhavn, 1909-1948, V A 70 and VI A 145.

[11] Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, VII A 82. Cf. I A.322.

[12] Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, II A 198 and X2 A 439.

[13] Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, X4 A 528 and 529.

[14] See Aristotle, Et. Nich. X, 7, 1777b 4. On the indispensability of the skolé see Pol. VII 1329a 1-2, p. 226; VII 1333a 31-1333b 1, p. 240; and VIII 1338a 1-6, p. 254.

[15] Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, X4 A 289; cf. XI1 A 180.

[16] Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, X2 A 431; cf. X1 A 573.

[17] Feuerbach, too, in Zur Beurtheilung der Schrift: “das Wesen des Christenthums”, written in 1842, now in Sammtliche Werke, W. Boline et al., eds., vol. 7, pp. 265-275, denounces the cleavage, not only in Hegel, but in the entire culture of his period, between “philosophers” and “professors of philosophy.” He underlines, in pp. 273-274, an essential difference between himself and Hegel: Hegel was a professor of philosophy, while I am no professor; Hegel lives, thinks and writes as an academic, while I do it as a man, simply as a man. He adds the following bitter comment: In any case, it is a fact, that we have reached a point where philosophy and the practice of philosophy are in absolute contradiction, and that the distinguishing trait of a philosopher is that he is not a professor of philosophy, and viceversa that of a professor of philosophy is that he is not a philosopher.

[18] Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, X2 A 431; see also X2 A 633. For Feuerbach, too, in Zur Beurtheilung, cit., p. 274, the division between “philosopher” and “professor” is a humoristic thing, which, however, given the cultural situation in contemporary Germany, has had in the end a positive effect on philosophy itself: Thus, philosophy has stepped down from the desk and has elevated itself, in appearance and fact, beyond the shallow limits of academic discipline; it is no longer something that interests only professors, but has become a concern for men, for integral and liberated men; therefore, solemn and sincere thanks to the reactions against philosophy!

[19] Voltaire, Candide ou de l'optimisme, J. Van den Heuvel, ed., Librairie Générale Française, Paris, 1983, V, p. 32. Pangloss, who works at the castle of Baron von Thunder-den-tronckh, «one of the most powerful lords of Westfalia,» as a private tutor, indeed, as the «oracle of the house», maintained that it is demonstrated that things cannot be other than what they are: because everything is made for an end, everything is made for the best end; consequently, those who have said that everything is good have said an absurdity; one should say that everything is for the best (I, pp. 20-21).

[20] Voltaire, Candide, V, p. 33.

[21] Voltaire, Candide, V, pp. 31-32, and I, p. 21.

[22] Voltaire, Candide, IV, pp. 28-30. Going backwards from cause to cause, this long chain connects a truly wise Franciscan monk, an old duchess, a cavalry captain, a marquise, a page, a Jesuit, and finally, all of Christopher Columbus's mates, who originally imported syphilis from America. Hence, syphilis was an indispensable thing within the best of worlds, a necessary ingredient. For, if Columbus had not gone to America, this terrible disease would not have spread out through Europe... but, notes wise Pangloss, «le plus grand philosophe de la province» (I, 21), Europe would not have chocolate and cochineal.

[23] Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, X2 A 431; see also X2 A 637.

[24] See Kierkegaard, Efterladte Papirer, V A 73.

[25] Aristotle, Pol. VII 1334a, cit. ed., lines 29, 9-10, 24, 23, 17, pp. 241-242. On the diagogé see VIII, 5, 1339a 23-31, p. 258.

[26] A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Sämtliche Werke. Band I, Textkrit. Edited by W. Frhr. von Löhneysen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1986, «Vorrede zur ersten Auflage,» p. 10. Schopenhauer speaks of «a philosophical method, here attempted for the first time, completely different from any previous one».

[27] Schopenhauer, Die Welt, p. 12. Here the author, echoing Horace, Sermones I, 9, 44, says that «his book will be only `paucorum hominum' and hence must, patiently and humbly, await the few whose uncommon way of thought will find it enjoyable».

[28] Ibidem.

[29] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, ed. cit., «Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage,» p. 14.

[30] Schopenhauer, Die Welt, pp. 14-45.

[31] Schopenhauer, Die Welt, p. 15.

[32] Ibidem.

[33] Schopenhauer, Die Welt, pp. 15-16. Schopenhauer speaks specifically of «a philosophical fracas» made by these «rioters» who pass themselves off as «universal sages». His concern is the destiny of truth. «Yes, I may say that no philosophy could be less propitious than one that is contemptibly misused as an instrument of the state on the one hand and a source of income on the other». «Truth is no whore …; rather she is such a disdainful beauty that even he who offers her his all can never be sure of meeting her favor».

[34] Schopenhauer, Die Welt, p. 24.

[35] Schopenhauer, Die Welt, p. 17 and p. 22.

[36] Schopenhauer, Die Welt, p. 26.

[37] Schopenhauer, Die Welt, pp. 23-25.

[38] Plato, Republic III, from 403c 9 to 406c 8.

[39] Plato, Republic, III, 407a 7-8, Platonis Opera, tomus IV, J. Burnet, ed., Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1962.

[40] See Plato, Republic III, from 407a 4 to 408b 5.

[41] Diogeneanus 4, 39; see Leutsch-Schneidewin, Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum, Gottingae, 1839-1851, I, 189-227 (rist. anast. Olms, Hildesheim, 1965), e W. Bühler, Zenobii Athoi Proverbia, Gottingae, 1982, I, 250-262.

[42] Gregorius of Cyprus, Ed. Leidense 1, 95: see Leutsch-Schneidewin, Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum, cit., II 93-130.

[43] Arsenius, 6, 8a. See Leutsch-Schneidewin, Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum, Gottingae, cit. II 233-744; see also Bühler, Zenobii Athoi Proverbia, cit., I, 293-299. Arsenius inherited and enriched the collection made by Father Michael Apostolius around the middle of the 15th century.

[44] Horace, Epistle «To Maecenas», I, 1, vv. 52-54.

[45] Aristotle, Politics VII, 1334b, ed. cit. 15-28, pp. 243-244; see Leg. II, 653 b ff. and 659d; see also Rep. IX, 591c ff.

[46] Aristotle, Pol. VIII, 1337a 39-1337b 21, pp. 252-253.

[47] Aristotle, Pol. VIII, 1338 b 2-3, p. 256.

[48] Aristotle, Pol. VIII, 1338a 1-3, p. 254.